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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Reggie Larson contends the district court erred by granting the State's motion to amend
the information mid-trial to add a new allegation of conduct underlying the charge over his
notice objection and by imposing his sentence based on a misunderstanding of the
recommendations in the presentence materials.
This reply is necessary to address the State's attempts to keep this Court from reaching
the merits of the notice issue based on procedural arguments which ignore and/or are directly
contrary to the applicable precedent, and in some cases, are even contrary to the position the
prosecutor took below. The State's arguments on the merits of that issue are no more persuasive
for similar reasons. Therefore, this Court should reject those arguments and grant relief based on
the district court's erroneous decision to allow the amendment to the information mid-trial.
The State's arguments on the sentencing issue are unremarkable, and so, requrre no
further reply.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Larsen's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court's decision to allow the State to amend the Information during
trial infringed on Mr. Larsen's substantial rights of due process and to prepare and
present a defense.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by basing its sentencing decision on a
clearly-erroneous understanding of the presentence materials.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court's Decision To Allow The State To Amend The Information During Trial
Infringed On Mr. Larsen's Substantial Rights Of Due Process And To Prepare And Present A
Defense

A.

The State's Procedural Arguments Are Meritless, As They Are Contrary To The
Applicable Supreme Court Precedent

1.

The State's argument under State v. Kralovec is precisely the same argument
which the Idaho Supreme Court expressly rejected in State v. Jeske, a decision
which the State's argument on this point does not mention

In arguing that the district court's decision to allow the State to amend the information
was an abuse of its discretion, Mr. Larsen identified the applicable legal standards set forth in
case law and explained how the district court's decision was not consistent with those standards.
(App. Br., pp.6-11.) Nevertheless, the State contends that, because Mr. Larsen did not formally

recite which prong of the test for abuse of discretion under which he was making that argument,
his claim must be rejected in toto under State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2 (2017). (Resp.
Br., p.10.)
The Idaho Supreme Court considered that precise argument in State v. Jeske:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, relying on a footnote in State v. Kralovec, 161
Idaho 569, 575 n.2 ... (2017), held that Jeske failed to state any standard of
review, and such failure was fatal to Jeske's claim regarding his objection to the
amending of the Information. The Court of Appeals seems to indicate that there
is a formalistic requirement that the standard of review be recited and the party
claiming error attack a particular prong of that standard of review.

State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 869 (2019) (emphasis added). The Jeske Court proceeded to
specifically reject the Court of Appeals' analysis on that issue:
While one could glean from reading footnote 2 in Kralovec that we require a
formalistic recitation of the abuse of discretion standard in order to review a claim
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of abuse of discretion, such a reading would be too technical. The real concern of
this Court is whether an appellant's arguments are supported with relevant
argument and authority. Therefore, this Court's main concerns are the use of
conclusory arguments, lack of authority to support those arguments, or failure to
make any attempt to address the factors this Court considers. Consequently,
Kralovec should not be read to require a formalistic recitation of the standard of
review.
Id. at 870 (internal citations and parentheticals omitted).

Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court's

precedent is clear: no formal recitation of the standard itself is required, nor must the party
ritualistically identify the prong of the test under which he is arguing. Id. The State's argument
in this regard has blatantly disregarded this clear precedent directly on point and should be
rejected accordingly.
The State's disregard of Jeske in this regard is particularly concerning because the State's
brief makes it clear it was actually aware of the decision in Jeske - it specifically cited Jeske for
its analysis of the notice issue in that case. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) However, it does not mention
Jeske elsewhere, even though Jeske's legal analysis about appellate practice generally actually

discussed in the context of the same sort of challenge Mr. Larsen is actually raising in this appeal
(his objection to a motion to amend the information). (See generally Resp. Br.) That the State
ignored the clear precedent on point despite having at least looked at the case in question is
troubling. Compare State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260,266 n.1 (Ct. App. 2019) (criticizing the State's
reliance on old precedent without acknowledging more recent Supreme Court precedent directly
on point), rev denied.
In light of Jeske, the State's procedural argument fails. Mr. Larsen identified the cases
which articulated the legal standard applicable to the district court's decision and then provided
substantial analysis as to why the district court's decision was not consistent with that legal
standard. (App. Br., pp.6-11.) This is precisely what the Jeske Court held to be appropriate:
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Although Jeske did not recite the standard of review in his opening brief, he
clearly argued regarding "whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it." He identified the legal standard that was applicable to the
choices before the district court by citing [the relevant rule, statute,] and relevant
case law. Next, Jeske presented an analysis of how the above stated authority was
not followed by the district court. Therefore, his was not merely a conclusory
argument, as was this Court's concern in Cummings[1] and Kralovec. Rather,
Jeske argued that the district court failed to comply with the second and third
prongs of the abuse of discretion standard. Consequently, the amendment issue
will be decided on its merits.
Jeske, 164 Idaho at 870 (internal citations omitted). Since Mr. Larsen did exactly the same thing

Mr. Jeske did, the State's attempt to throw a procedural roadblock against this issue in this regard
is meritless and should be rejected as such.

2.

The State's preservation arguments take a manifestly-different position on this
issue of notice than the prosecutor took below

The State dedicates a substantial portion of its brief to arguing that Mr. Larsen did not
make an objection on the basis of notice. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-14.) That appellate argument
actually runs contrary to the position the prosecutor took on the issue of notice below, and so,
should be rejected.
The prosecutor's position on the issue of notice was defined by the fact that it was he
who first raised the question of notice on this issue to the district court. Specifically, in arguing
his motion to amend the information, the prosecutor asserted: "I think the defendant's on notice
of it because I think it's the same," since both acts alleged "manual/genital" contact. 2
(Tr., p.802, Ls.9-18.) Mr. Larsen then ultimately responded by arguing, "I don't think it would
be appropriate to proceed on something that Mr. Larkin (sic) didn't have notice of" (Tr., p.804,

1

Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 853 (2016).
Specifically, the originally-charged act alleged Mr. Larsen had touched A.L.'s genitals, and the
new allegation alleged Mr. Larsen had made A.L. touch his genitals.
2
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Ls.13-15.) As will be discussed in depth infra, "if the issue was argued to ... the district court it
can form the basis for review by this Court." Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868 (citing State v. Du Valt, 131
Idaho 550, 553 (1998)). Therefore, by the prosecutor taking a position on the issue of notice in
the district court, the State's position below was necessarily that the issue of notice was argued to
the district court, and as such, that issue was preserved for appeal.
Nevertheless, the State now wants to change its position in that regard and seeks to argue
on appeal that the issue of notice was not preserved for appeal.

(See Resp. Br., pp. I 0-11

(arguing that Mr. Larsen did not preserve the notice issue because he did not object to the motion
to amend the charges on that basis).) As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly
made clear, it is manifestly unfair for a party to change its position on an issue between the trial
proceedings and the appellate proceedings.

State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017);

accord State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226 (2019); State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019).

Since the State is effectively changing its position with respect to whether the issue of notice was
raised in the district court, and thus, preserved for appeal, this Court should reject the State's
preservation arguments outright.

3.

Mr. Larsen immediately backtracked his initial statement of "no objection" and
made two clear arguments in response to the motion to amend the information,
one of what was a failure to provide notice

Although Mr. Larsen's attorney initially said he had no objection to the State's motion to
amend the information, he very clearly and quickly changed his mind and raised two points in
response to the State's motion, one of which was a notice objection:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, yeah, I'm not -- I don't object to that, to either
one.
THE COURT: Okay.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But as -- and my timing's off right now, but I'd like to
say it while I'm thinking about it. It occurred to me that, as [the prosecutor] was
speaking to the Court about how he'd like to have that -- that changed, that the -my request about the unanimity jury verdict is maybe more important because,
until this trial, I had no reports and no information that there had -- that -- as far as
I know -- I mean, maybe [the prosecutor] pointed out that I actually had it and
was ignorant of it -- about the allegation that [Mr. Larsen] had taken [A.L. 's] hand
and placed it on his penis. And that would certainly fall under the category of
other lewd acts, which is that catchall language.
On the other hand, I don 't -- I don't think it would be appropriate to
proceed on something that Mr. Larkin (sic) didn 't have notice of If we had
notice, then I'm absolutely wrong, I guess, but I don 't remember seeing anything
in the discovery about that.

(Tr., p.803, L.20 - p.804, L.18 (emphasis added).)

Thus, the whole record, in context,

demonstrates that, although trial counsel did not initially recognize the notice issue, he did so
within the next moment or two and clearly brought that issue to the district court's attention. 3
Thus, the full context of trial counsel's argument reveals that he did, ultimately, contest the issue
of notice. Compare Dep 't of Environmental Quality v. Gibson, 166 Idaho 424, _ , 461 P.3d
706, 720-21 (2020) (holding that, even though the appellant had consistently argued one position
below, the fact that the appellant affirmatively changed his position on that issue on the eve of
trial and the district court exercised its discretion to accept that argument and rule on it, the
appellant had properly preserved his new position for appeal).
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in the criminal law context, "if the issue
was argued to, or decided by, the district court it can form the basis for review by this Court."
Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868 (citing Du Valt, 131 Idaho at 553) (emphasis added). This is because the

3

The fact that Mr. Larsen renewed his concerns about the lack of notice during the jury
instruction conference reinforces the conclusion that the position he ultimately took on this point
was there was no notice to allow for the addition of the new charge. (Tr., p.868, Ls.20-25 ("I
suppose in this case that or they [the jurors] could find that Mr. Larsen made [A.L.] touch his
penis, and that would be -- that would constitute a lewd act, even though, you known, we weren't
on -- we were not on notice of that based on the discovery.") (emphasis added).)
7

Supreme Court "recognizes a distinction between issues not formally raised below and issues
that 'never surfaced' below."' Id. (quoting Kolar v. Cassia Cty. Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354
(2005)). In other words, so long as "the bedrock" of the argument was made below, the issue is
preserved for appeal, even if the argument below was vague. State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903,
914 (2019).
The issue of notice definitely surfaced below, as both Mr. Larsen and the prosecutor
ultimately presented arguments about the issue of notice to the district court.

(Tr., p.802,

Ls.9-18, p.804, Ls.13-18.) Thus, even though Mr. Larsen may not have formally objected on this
issue, the issue was still preserved for appeal. 4 Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868. Regardless of the fact
that Mr. Larsen's argument may have been somewhat vague due to trial counsel's initial failure
to recognize the notice issue, the bedrock of the notice argument is clearly present in the record,
and therefore, properly pursued on appeal. Godwin, 164 Idaho at 914; see also Ada County
Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 165 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017) (noting that, where an

appellate argument maintains the same position as was taken below, the argument is properly
considered on appeal). Therefore, the fact that trial counsel's initial reaction was "no objection"
is of no matter because he immediately withdrew that position and actually argued against the
State's motion based on the lack of notice. As such, Mr. Larsen's trial attorney adequately
preserved the notice issue for appeal. 5
Additionally, the fact that trial counsel made his notice argument alongside his argument
for a unanimity instruction is of no matter. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-13.) That is because he

4

The State's continued insistence on formalities in this regard without acknowledging Jeske's
decision directly on point is, as it was with the Kralovec argument, concerning.
5
Because there was a sufficient objection on notice grounds, the State's point about Mr. Larsen
not providing any argument under the fundamental error standard is revealed to be yet another
attempt to distract this Court with an irrelevant red herring. (See Resp. Br., p.11.)
8

ultimately framed the two as alternative arguments. (Tr., p.803, L.23 - p.804, L.18 (arguing the
unanimity instruction issue and arguing, "[ o ]n the other hand," the matter should not proceed at
all since there had not been proper notice).)

Basically, his argument with respect to the

unanimity instruction issue was addressing what should happen if the district court ultimately
allowed the amendment, but that does not mean he was ultimately conceding that the amendment
was appropriate in the first place. The fact that Mr. Larsen's attorney ultimately made two
alternative arguments in response to the State's motion to amend the information meant he
preserved both issues for appeal, not just the first one he discussed.

B.

The State's Arguments On The Merits Are Also Meritless Because They Are Also
Contrary To The Applicable Supreme Court And Court Of Appeals Precedent

1.

There was inadequate notice because there was no indication the State was
intending to pursue a conviction based on fleeting references in the discovery to
third-party, hearsay allegations which had not been endorsed by the alleged victim
prior to the trial

The State's arguments on the merits of the notice issue are no more persuasive than its ,
unfounded procedural arguments.

Primary, it contends that, by simply alleging "manual to

genital ... contact" as one means by which the alleged lewd conduct was committed (R., p.42),
the notice requirement was satisfied with respect to any allegation involving someone's hand
touching someone's genitals.

(Resp. Br., pp.15-20.)

The case law contradicts the State's

position.
As the Court of Appeals has expressly recognized, when there are multiple ways in which
the alleged offense could have been committed, mere use of the statutory language is insufficient
to meet the notice requirements. State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing
State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, _ , 65 P.2d 156, 159-60 (1937) (applying this rule to
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manslaughter); State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 927 (Ct. App. 1997) (applying this rule to theft));
see also State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566-67 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the need for similar

specificity in charging documents in the context of lewd conduct).

The point of the notice

requirement is that the State must make the defendant aware of the means by which he is alleged
to have violated the law, not just the law he is alleged to have violated. E.g., Dorsey, 139 Idaho
at 151. When there are multiple actions which could potentially be the target of the charge, a
mere recitation of the statutory language ("manual to genital contact") does not make it clear
what the actual means, what specific conduct, is being alleged as the means by which the
defendant is alleged to have violated the statute. As such, a mere recitation of the statutory
language in such situations is not sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement. See id.; compare
See State v. Gumm, 99 Idaho 549 (1978).

For example, in Gumm, several items had been stolen in a single event. Id. at 550. The
charging document recited only the statutory language regarding theft; it did not specifically
identify which items were actually being alleged as stolen. Id. at 551. The Idaho Supreme Court
held that charging document failed to provide adequate notice because of the failure to
specifically identify the particular items (i.e., the specific act/s of theft) that were the focus of the
criminal charge. Id.
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals pointed out in Colwell, the notice requirement
looks at more than just whether the defendant was aware that the alternative allegation had been
made; it also evaluates whether he was aware "that the state intended to prosecute him and
obtain a conviction for these additional acts." Colwell, 124 Idaho at 567 (emphasis added); cf
Gumm, 99 Idaho at 552 (still finding a prejudicial notice violation even though, prior to trial, the

State had disclosed a list of all the pieces of property which could potentially have been the

subject of the charge). 6 In other words, while the fact that Mr. Larsen may have been aware that
certain additional allegations existed, that only affects the determination of proper remedy, not
the determination of whether sufficient notice had been provided by the charging document. Id.
Accordingly, the fact that there were fleeting references to third-hand, hearsay statements
from A.L.' s father and brother in the discovery was not, contrary to the State's belief, sufficient
to give Mr. Larsen the required notice because nothing about the fleeting references to those
allegations demonstrate the State intended to pursue a conviction based on those allegations.

(See Resp. Br., pp.20-21.) That conclusion is particularly apparent in this case because there is
no indication in the discovery that A.L. actually endorsed those allegations, and the CARES
report, which was the only document filed in support of the initial complaint, did not reference
the third-party, hearsay allegations at all.

(R., pp.4-6.)

Therefore, the fact that additional

allegations had been made by third parties was not, by itself, sufficient to show proper notice
because there was no indication the State intended to pursue a conviction based on those
fleetingly-referenced third-party allegations. See Gumm, 99 Idaho at 551-52; Colwell, 124 Idaho
at 566.
The fact that Colwell involved a slightly different fact pattern in this regard (i.e., that the
other allegations in Colwell occurred on a different day, whereas all the conduct in this case was
6

The procedural stance of Gumm is a little confusing. In that case, the district court denied the
State's motion to amend the information because the defendant did not have the requisite notice.
Gumm, 99 Idaho at 5 51. Based on that decision, the district court dismissed the case based on
the fact that the only charge at issue did not provide sufficient notice of any criminal conduct.
See id.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision to dismiss the case because, while it agreed the
charging document itself failed to provide the requisite notice, it also concluded the defendant
could not be said to be unduly surprised by the unalleged information, as the State had actually
disclosed a list of all the property which could have been the basis of the charge. Id. at 551-52.
As such, the Supreme Court concluded the appropriate course of action upon denying the motion
to amend the information was to either continue the trial or order a mistrial, not dismissing the
case entirely. Id. at 552.
11

alleged to have occurred on the same day) does not, as the State believes, makes the legal
principles it was applying any less applicable to Mr. Larsen's case. (See App. Br., p.8 n.4;

compare Resp. Br., pp.18-19 (seeking to distinguish Colwell on this basis).) Whether or not that
other conduct is alleged to have occurred at the same time as the initially-charged conduct says
little about whether the defendant had sufficient notice of the State's intent to seek a conviction
based on that other conduct. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Gumm bears this
conclusion out.
As noted supra, in Gumm, several items had been stolen in one event. Id. at 550. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that charging document failed to provide adequate notice because it
failed to specifically identify the particular items (i.e., the specific act/s of theft) that were the
focus of the criminal charge. Id. That demonstrates the purported distinction which the State is
trying to draw between Mr. Larsen's case and Colwell- based on when the other alleged conduct
occurred on the same day or different days - is not a material distinction because there was still
insufficient notice in Gumm even though the potential conduct at issue all occurred on the same
day. See id.
This is also where the prosecutor's assertion that the two acts at issue in Mr. Larsen's
case could have led to separate charges becomes relevant. 7 (Compare Resp. Br., pp.19-20 (the
State, failing to understand this point, arguing the prosecutor's assertion in that regard to be
irrelevant).)

If the two allegations could have been charged separately, as the prosecutor

7

The State is correct that there is a typographical error in the Appellant's Brief in the citation to
the transcript with respect to the prosecutor's assertion that each portion of the alleged conduct
could have been charged separately. (See App. Br., p.8 n.4; Resp. Br., p.19.) The citation should
have been, as the State actually recognized, to "Tr., p.873, L.23 - p.874, L.3," as opposed to
"Tr., p.862, Ls.2-7." (See Resp. Br., p.19.) Mr. Larsen apologizes for the confusion in that
regard.
12

indicated, then the State's attempt to distinguish Colwell based on the timing of the events is not
based on a material difference of facts.
Since Colwell is not materially distinct from Mr. Larsen's case, its legal analysis remains
controlling in his case, and as such, this Court should reach the same result in this case. If there
was not sufficient notice in Colwell - where, at least, the other allegations had been made by the
alleged victim herself - because there was no indication the State actually intended to pursues a
conviction based on those other allegations, then there certainly was not sufficient notice in
Mr. Larsen's case to show the State intended to pursue a conviction based on the fleeting
reference to the allegations of third parties which were based on hearsay and which had not been
endorsed by the alleged victim. As such, it was improper to allow the amendment to include
those additional allegations mid-trial.

2.

The State's prejudice argument fails to address the proper standard; in actuality, it
is trying to argue the prejudice caused by allowing the mid-trial amendment is
harmless based on overwhelming evidence without mentioning the recent Idaho
Supreme Court decision which flatly rejected such arguments

First, trial counsel's assertion that he did not remember seeing anything in the discovery
speaking to the new allegation was a sufficient argument with respect to the prejudice prong.
(See Resp. Br., pp.25-26 (trying, yet again, to get this Court to ignore the merits of this issue on

procedural grounds by baselessly asserting trial counsel did not argue the prejudice prong
below).) Trial counsel's argument indicated that the defense team had not, to his recollection,
been informed that the State was going to pursue a conviction based on that previouslyunendorsed allegation, and so, indicated they had been misled as to the nature of the charges
against Mr. Larsen to the point that they were not in a position to be able to meet those new
allegations at trial. Compare Gumm, 99 Idaho at 552 (noting that the lack of notice can still be
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sufficiently prejudicial to prevent the amendment of the information at trail even though the
proper remedy may only be a mistrial if the defendant was not "surprised" by information with
which the State is trying to amend). Therefore, the bedrock, at least, of the prejudice argument is
present in counsel's argument below record, and thus, that aspect of the issue is properly argued
on appeal.

See Godwin, 164 Idaho at 914 (explaining that, so long as "the bedrock" of the

argument is in the record, it may be pursued on appeal); see also Brooke View, 165 Idaho at 142
n.2 (explaining it is appropriate for a party to clean up an argument on appeal and offer
additional arguments and authorities to support its position on an issue, so long as its position on
the issue remains the same as it was in the trial court).
Turning to the merits of the prejudice analysis, the controlling precedent makes it clear
that, when there is a question of whether a lack of notice was prejudicial, "' [t ]he true inquiry ...
is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as
to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused."' State v. McBride, 123 Idaho 263, 267 (Ct. App.
1992) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935)) (ellipsis from McBride). The
defendant's substantial rights in this regard include "'that the accused shall be definitely
informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not
be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial."' Id. (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 82).
As such, the proper standard for assessing prejudice in this regard is best stated as:
"Under the notice element of this standard, the appellate court is required to determine whether
the record suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his defense." Id.; accord State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182
(2008) (quoting State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 418 (1985) (in turn, citing Berger, 295 U.S. 78,
82-84 (1935))); see also Colwell, 124 Idaho at 565-66 (applying the standard from Berger and
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Windsor). None of the State's arguments address the actual standard for whether there was a
variance in notice. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.23-25.) Rather, they all speak to the irrelevant
question of whether there was a variance in proof

(See Resp. Br., pp.23-25 (arguing, for

example, that, because of all the other evidence the State presented, the initial defense strategy
was not plausible, and so, there could be no prejudice from Mr. Larsen having to change defense
strategies mid-trial based on the amendment to the information).)
Under the proper standard, the prejudice in Mr. Larsen's case is readily evident. As
discussed supra, the information provided pretrial only indicated an intent to pursue a conviction
based on A.L. 's own allegation that Mr. Larsen had touched her genitals, and nothing in the
discovery indicated an intent to also pursue a conviction based on the fleeting reference to thirdparty, hearsay allegations that Mr. Larsen made A.L. touch his genitals, particularly since there
was no indication in the discovery that A.L. endorsed those other allegations herself Allowing
the amendment to include that new theory of the criminal charge meant Mr. Larsen had
effectively been misled about the nature of the offense he would be required to defend against at
trial.

Compare Gumm, 99 Idaho at 552 (agreeing with the district court that allowing an

amendment when the defendant did not have proper notice of the facts with which the State was
seeking to amend and then immediately requiring the defendant to defend against those new
factual allegations at trial would prejudice the defendant's substantial rights). Thus, allowing

that amendment was prejudicial.
Moreover, Mr. Larsen was embarrassed in his presentation of his defense when the State
added in the additional act of Mr. Larsen making A.L. touch his genitals into the mix. Once the
goalpost was moved in that manner, Mr. Larsen was forced to all but abandon one part of his
defense theory, since it only had relevance to the first alleged act, not the second.
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This

embarrassment in the presentation of the defense further demonstrates that the amendment itself
was prejudicial. That prejudice (the effect on the jury from seeing Mr. Larsen abandon part of
his theory mid-trial) still exists regardless of how successful the State thinks that defense strategy
was likely to have ultimately been.
Once the proper standard for prejudice is understood, the State's arguments in this regard
are actually revealed to be an attempt to argue that any prejudice caused by this error would have
been harmless due to the other evidence the State presented at trial. (See Resp. Br., pp.23-25.)
Of course, such an argument based on the "overwhelming" nature of the other evidence is not
proper under the standard for harmless error. See State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, _ , 462 P.3d
1125, 1138-39 (2020) ("To rely on the 'overwhelming evidence' standard is to commit the same
mistake the United States Supreme Court overturned in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. [18, 24
(1967)]."). 8 Therefore, this Court should reject the State's attempt to avoid Garcia's holding by
inaccurately recasting its argument in that regard as one related to the prejudice caused by the
late amendment. See also State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding that, where
the State failed to argue the actual harmless error standard, it failed to carry its burden to prove
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the case had to be remanded as a
result of the error).
Under Garcia's standard, the prejudice caused by the lack of sufficient notice was not
harmless because its probative force cannot be said to be minimal in the context of the entire
case. See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1139. By giving the jurors a second basis upon which to reach
their verdict, they could disregard any reasonable doubts they may have had about the originallyalleged act, upon which they might have otherwise acquitted Mr. Larsen, and convicted him
8

The State's brief does not mention Garcia at all, even though Garcia was issued two months
before the State filed its brief
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based solely on the new, improperly-included allegation. See State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301
(2000) (holding that, where there were two theories upon which the jury could have convicted
the defendant, and one was erroneously available to the jury, the error was not harmless because
it was not possible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
verdict rendered).
Since, Mr. Larsen did not have adequate notice that the State was going to try to seek a
conviction on that alternative factual allegation, and since amending the information mid-trial
misled or embarrassed Mr. Larsen in the preparation and presentation of his defense, the district
court abused its discretion by allowing the mid-trial amendment.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Basing Its Sentencing Decision On A ClearlyErroneous Understanding Of The Presentence Materials
The State's responses concerning the district court's error in imposing Mr. Larsen's
sentence are not remarkable, and as such, no further reply is necessary in regard to those issues.
Accordingly, Mr. Larsen simply refers the Court back to pages 11-13 of his Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Larsen respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and the jury verdict and
remand this case for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court

vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 21 st day of August, 2020.
/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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